Insurance coverage disputes often rise or fall on sweeping questions — trigger theories, allocation frameworks, priority of coverage. But sometimes the battle comes down to something dramatically smaller: a comma. Or, as two recent cases reveal, the lack of a comma. Both Garlock v. Jordan, 260 N.E.3d 42 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025), and Accelerant Specialty Insurance Co. v. Big Apple Designers, Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150584 (E.D.N.Y. 2025), show how punctuation can tip the scales during a coverage fight.
In Garlock, an Ohio appellate court sorted through a dog-bite exclusion stitched together with a long list of breeds and a dangling modifier. In Big Apple, the Eastern District of New York parsed an insurance application question where grammar opened the door to multiple, materially different interpretations.
The two cases reached different outcomes, but both offer a vivid reminder: When punctuation creates ambiguity, interpretive canons step in.
Garlock v. Jordan: A Dog-Bite Exclusion with a Grammar Problem
Garlock v. Jordan arose out of a bite by a partial-breed Rottweiler at the insured’s property. The homeowners policy excluded injuries “caused by full or partial breed Dobermans, German Shepherds, Pit Bulls, Chows, Akitas and Rottweilers or any other dog or dogs, regardless of breed, that have been involved in past human biting incident.”
Coverage turned on the reach of the trailing modifier “that have been involved in past human biting incident.” Because the sentence lacked a comma before that clause, the structure generated two grammatically viable interpretations.
The insured argued that — because there was no comma — the modifier “that have been involved in a human biting incident” applied to the entire list, meaning that even Rottweilers were excluded only if they had a prior biting incident.
The insurer argued that the modifier applied only to “any other dog or dogs.” That reading relied on the “last antecedent rule” — a canon of construction applying a trailing modifier only to the word or phrase immediately before it, unless a comma signals broader application. Under that approach, the six named breeds were always excluded, regardless of bite history, and only “any other dog or dogs” required a history of biting.
The court sided with the insurer’s interpretation. Although both readings were grammatically possible, the court decided only the insurer’s reading was reasonable. The insureds’ reading rendered the lengthy list of named breeds pointless. If all dogs required a prior bite incident, there would be no need to single out certain breeds.
Accelerant Specialty Ins. Co. v. Big Apple Designers, Inc.: A Missing Comma Lets a Modifier Run Wild
The punctuation dispute in Big Apple concerned not a policy but an insurance application, where New York law demands strict construction against insurers.
Question 8 on the application asked whether: “any applicant [has] been indicted for or convicted of any degree of the crime of fraud, bribery, arson or any other arson-related crime in connection with this or any other property.”
Big Apple answered “No.” But the answer was not obviously correct. Five months before completing the application, Big Apple and several of its principals had been indicted for insurance fraud, conspiracy, and falsifying business records after allegedly underreporting payroll by paying workers in cash. The company therefore had been indicted for fraud.
The question, then, was whether the fraud indictment was one Big Apple was required to disclose. Big Apple argued that the final modifying phrase — “in connection with this or any other property” — applied to all the listed crimes (fraud, bribery, arson, and arson-related offenses). In its view, the question only required disclosure of fraud related to property, and its payroll-reporting fraud was not property related. In support of this interpretation, Big Apple cited the “series qualifier” canon, which holds that, where a sentence contains a parallel list followed by a modifier, the modifier ordinarily applies to the entire list. Under this approach, the property qualifier would apply to all four crimes — fraud, bribery, arson, and arson-related crime.
Accelerant, the insurer, cited the last-antecedent rule cited in Garlock and argued that the property qualifier applied only to the last term (“arson-related crime”), meaning fraud or bribery of any kind had to be disclosed, and Big Apple’s failure to do so was a material misrepresentation.
The court sided with Big Apple and found the insured’s reading more reasonable. It noted that the list was structurally parallel, supporting the application of the series-qualifier canon, and emphasized that, under New York law, any ambiguity in an application question must be resolved in the insured’s favor. The court held that a reasonable applicant could interpret the modifier as applying to all four crimes. Thus, Big Apple won the punctuation dispute (though it would go on to ultimately lose the case on separate, non-punctuation-related grounds).
Conclusion: A Comma Can Be the Most Expensive Mark on the Page
Garlock and Big Apple arrive at different outcomes but share a common lesson: Punctuation and syntax can meaningfully reshape coverage. In Garlock, the court’s desire to avoid redundancy defeated the ambiguity identified by the insured. In Big Apple, ambiguity carried the day, and the insured won the grammar fight outright, even though it ultimately lost the case on a separate issue related to the same application question.
When exclusions, application questions, or policy conditions are drafted without linguistic precision, courts must rely on grammatical canons — rules that often favor policyholders when more than one reasonable reading exists. And as these cases show, sometimes the smallest mark on the page can carry the largest consequences.